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[Elven when [a] skill is intended to be a central value of a
course, the skill as such will be absorbed by the bulk of the stu-
dents only if the skill is made explicitly, sustainedly, insistently
the focus of organization and of class treatment.1
Law professors often lament the quality of the work their
students produce on essay exams. This concern seems espe-
cially true of faculty who teach first year students. They ex-
press disappointment-and surprise-at their students' final
exams: missed issues, incomplete or inaccurate rules, poor use
of facts-these are only some of the skills students fail to
demonstrate at the level their teachers expected. What hap-
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1978, Columbia University Teachers College; J.D. 1986, City University of New
York School of Law; LL.M. Advocacy 1990, Georgetown University Law Center.
The idea of directly integrating skills across the curriculum and some of the intro-
ductory remarks to this paper were first printed in Professor David Nadvorney's
2002 article, Teaching Legal Reasoning Skills in Substantive Courses: A Practical
View, 5 N.Y. CiTY L. REV. 109 (2002). We would like to thank Professor Jeffrey
Kirchmeier for his insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. We
would also like to thank our colleagues on the symposium panel, Professors Mir-
iam Cherry, Deborah Post and Celia Taylor, for an enriching discussion of the vari-
ous ways the Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon case can be used as a teaching
vehicle, as well as Professor James Fishman and the PACE LAw REVIEW for spon-
soring this symposium. Finally, we must thank Courtney Schusheim and Ruth
Cusick for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC.
211, 213 (1948-49).
PACE LAW REVIEW
pens between the class and the exam, and why are our expecta-
tions routinely disappointed?
Much has been made of the connection between teaching
and testing, and how important it is to "test what we teach."
Long a concern in other disciplines, issues regarding testing
have increasingly been of concern to law school professors. In
discussions among law professors, the most common complaints
concerning students' final exams are as expected: students miss
issues, state the applicable doctrine incorrectly or incompletely,
misapply the rule even when they set it out accurately, ignore
relevant facts or rely on unwarranted factual assumptions,
write in a disorganized or inefficient style, fail to analyze argu-
ments on both sides, either ignore or abuse policy and make un-
supported legal conclusions. In addition, professors report that
students' exams demonstrate lack of understanding of some ba-
sic legal concepts and structures such as relevance, scope of ju-
dicial review, differing burdens of proof and the role of appellate
courts. 2 When these same professors are asked to list, from
their own course syllabi, the topics that the course covers, these
results are also for the most part predictable. Torts classes na-
tionwide cover intentional torts, negligence, products liability,
etc. A typical contracts syllabus usually starts with contract
formation (some start with damages) and goes on to include de-
fenses, parol evidence and third-party beneficiaries. Civil pro-
cedure courses cover personal and subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Erie Doctrine, venue, etc.
There is something wrong with this picture. We want our
students to learn the legal reasoning skills necessary to develop
sound legal argument, 3 yet the message we send them, at least
2. We recognize that this list is not exhaustive, and it may make students'
work appear generally to be worse than reality. Our intention within the scope of
this piece is only to highlight some of the major problem areas that stick in profes-
sors' minds about their students' work.
3. Karl Llewllyn describes what the case class should be:
[A] cooperative, supervised, systematic exercise in diagnosis of a problem; in
organization of data; in the arts of reaching for, building and testing solu-
tions or arguments; of making reasoned judgments of policy and putting
them to the test; an exercise in the craft-skill-and the human skill-of ac-
curate, orderly, persuasive formulation in language of thoughts that need
such organization and expression in order to accomplish a given purpose.
Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 215.
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on paper, is that today we are studying homicide, tomorrow
theft crimes, next week and for the rest of the semester, doc-
trine of some other name.4 While first-year casebooks often
have a skills orientation in the form of practice exercises and
problems, they typically fail to advise students of any skills pur-
pose underlying the book. Rather, the introduction, table of
contents and chapter headings of typical casebooks describe
only, or primarily, the doctrine to be covered in the book.5 So
too do typical syllabi list substantive units rather than skills to
be covered.
Of course, reasoning skills such as issue spotting, fact iden-
tification, fact analysis, rule identification and application of
rules to facts are taught in law school classes. At most law
schools these skills are taught in separate legal writing and
lawyering courses. Typically, however, the legal writing faculty
is not tenure-track, the credit allocation is minimal and the
course is otherwise marginalized, thereby sending a message to
students that such skills work is of secondary importance. 6
Doctrinal professors highlight these skills as they analyze cases
4. Professor Hornstein laments "the number of casebooks organized about the
doctrinal components of the law when compared with the paucity (non-existence)
of casebooks organized around the analytic or reasoning component." Alan D.
Hornstein, The Myth of Legal Reasoning, 40 MD. L. REV. 338, 347 n.9 (1981). Pro-
fessor Harry Jones' oft-cited comment from 1948 is no less apt today: "one of the
primary problems for law students in the first year is that they have 'no under-
standing as to what [their] instructors are trying to do."' Harry W. Jones, Notes on
the Teaching of Legal Method, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13, 13 (1948).
5. Professor Wangerin points out that while "all first year case book authors
view their books as tools for the development of legal analysis skills as well as for
teaching substantive concepts . . . the introductions to many of these casebooks
make little or no reference to skills as part of their contents." Paul T. Wangerin,
Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MiAMi L. REV.
409, 412 n.4 (1986).
6. See Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and
Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 48-49 (2007); Kathryn M.
Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools' Dirty Little
Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 3, 7 (2001) (discussing the low status teaching
positions for legal writing teaching and the resulting gender discrimination); Jan
M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages: Breaking the Last
Taboo, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551, 556-59 (2001) (outlining the history of
legal writing professorships and the trend for non-tenure-track legal writing teach-
ing positions); Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track
Directors and Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 530, 537-38 (1995) (noting that tenure-track legal writing professorships are
a recent development).
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and other materials, develop the skills when they use hypothet-
icals and refine the skills during Socratic dialogue (whether
"hard" or "soft"). But it seems as if they hardly ever, except in
legal methods or legal process courses, explicitly name them as
part of the subject matter for the day.7
This disconnect is a critical failing of legal education: stu-
dents in the first year should learn academic skills explicitly,
rather than intuit them, so that they are better prepared in
their second and third years to focus on the denser doctrines
and inclusion of more practice-oriented skills. While academic
skills are often taught explicitly in non-doctrinal classes, such
as legal methods and legal writing classes, they should also be
taught across the curriculum, incorporated directly into doctri-
nal classes. Case reading is the fundamental skill of first-year
law school, and the source of understanding much more than
black letter law. But students are intent on finding rules, doc-
trine and "the law" in cases, and very often overlook the wealth
of information about how the law works contained in the cases.
In fact, their course syllabi tell them to look for the law and not
much else.8
7. Professor Schwartz has criticized law school instruction as requiring "self-
teaching." He explains:
[Law professors expect students to figure out on their own what the stu-
dents need to know and what they need to be able to do to succeed in the
class. During classroom instruction, law professors hope the combination of
their classroom comments and their critiques of students' comments will en-
hance students' legal reasoning, case analysis, issue spotting, drafting, and
policy analysis skills, will open the students' minds to legal theory, will al-
low the students to understand the doctrine under study, and will encourage
students to develop desired values. Law teachers, however, usually fail to
identify for their students (and, sometimes, even for themselves) which
goals they are teaching at any given moment. This approach requires the
students not only to sort the insightful student comments from the com-
ments lacking insight, but also to figure out, from the professor's comments
and questions, both the professor's instructional goals and the relationships
between those goals and the instruction presented.
Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and
Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
347, 352 (2001).
8. See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 212 (noting that "law teachers themselves
have fallen into the general practice of seeing the vital lines of organization of a
course (and hence also of the cases to be chosen and arranged) as consisting rather
of 'subject matter' than of the skills of the lawyer"). Although Llewellyn made
those comments almost sixty years ago, they are no less apt today. See David S.
Romantz, The Truth about Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law
274
INTEGRATING ACADEMIC SKILLS
There are myriad ways in which real legal methods objec-
tives can be directly incorporated into a traditional first-year
syllabus.9 The idea underlying this Article, first set forth in
Professor David Nadvorney's 2002 article, Teaching Legal Rea-
soning Skills in Substantive Courses: A Practical View, 10 is to
identify particular cases and readings throughout the syllabi of
first year courses that would lend themselves to explicit teach-
ing of one or more of the analysis skills we are trying to teach.
Those skills would then be incorporated into the syllabus, either
by name only or with a short notation. Students would be di-
rected to pay particular attention to a case for its illustration of
the skills we expect them to learn for the final exam. Just as
the author of the casebook searches out cases that set out a rule
of law in a certain way, and just as the professor constructs the
syllabus to particular sections of the casebook in a particular
order, some of those choices can be matched up with skills in-
struction, ideally without too much intrusion on the established
design of the course.
This Article follows up on Professor Nadvorney's initial pro-
posal with one example. As a prototype, the Article focuses on
one skill and one contracts case, useful for teaching that skill.
The Article focuses on the "Good Faith and Best Efforts" doctri-
nal unit in the first-year contracts course, and Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, the leading case on good faith and best ef-
forts, that is included in most contracts casebooks. Specifically,
this Article will make concrete suggestions for using the Lady
Duff-Gordon case as a vehicle to teach the role of facts in legal
reasoning. While more and more emphasis has been put on the
important skill of fact analysis in recent years, and fact issues
are now generally taught at a minimum in clinical and lawyer-
ing courses at most schools, most schools still have a continued
emphasis on doctrinal reasoning. The core bar courses and elec-
School Curriculum, 52 KAN. L. REV. 105, 143 (2003) (noting that "[d]octrinal teach-
ers organize their law courses around neat subject-matter lines, often ignoring the
fluid nature of lawyering, and thus fail to teach students the holistic process re-
quired to solve the client's issues.").
9. Although the ideas and methods discussed in this Article are applicable
throughout all three years of law school, they are most relevant and powerful in
the first-year curriculum.
10. David Nadvorney, Teaching Legal Reasoning Skills in Substantive
Courses: A Practical View, 5 N.Y. CiTy L. REV. 109 (2002).
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tives continue to be doctrine-centric, despite the fact that what
practicing lawyers do most is "investigate, gather, research, as-
similate, and understand the relevance of facts."" Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, which deals with the amorphous and
highly fact-sensitive doctrines of good faith and best efforts, is
especially good for teaching fact analysis because of the subtle,
but artful, use of facts by Judge Benjamin Cardozo.
Part I of the Article discusses the need to reorient students'
thinking about learning the law, highlighting the critical impor-
tance of explicitly teaching academic skills-and specifically
fact identification and fact analysis-across the curriculum,
rather than solely in skills-oriented classes. Part II provides
some background regarding the Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon case
and the doctrines of good faith and best efforts, which that case
is typically used to teach. Part III then critically examines the
facts of the case and Judge Cardozo's characterization of the
facts, and sets forth concrete ways the Lady Duff-Gordon case
can be used to teach the skills of fact identification and fact
analysis.
I. Deemphasizing Doctrine: The Importance of Fact Analysis
The main part of intellectual education is not the acquisition of
facts, but learning how to make facts live. The mark of a master is
that facts, which before lay scattered in an inorganic mass, when
he shoots through them the magnetic current of this thought, leap
into an organic order and live and bear fruit. 12
Students typically enter law school under the illusion that
the law is something to be "learned" (i.e., memorized), and that
if they "learn" (memorize) the doctrine, they will be successful
law students and ultimately successful lawyers. Although law
professors generally understand the short-sightedness of such a
strategy and recognize the need for students to master legal and
factual analysis as well as legal doctrine, 13 in teaching legal rea-
11. Abraham P. Ordover, Teaching Sensitivity to Facts, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 813, 814 (1991).
12. Wangerin, supra note 5, at 431 (quoting Judge Holmes Oration, 3 LAW Q.
REVIEW 118, 118 (1887)).
13. In 1996, Professor Steven I. Friedland surveyed law professors nationwide
about their teaching methods and goals and found that at least forty-six percent of
professors teaching first year courses considered their primary goal to be teaching
[Vol. 28:271
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soning and interpretation, analyzing facts has always taken a
back seat to legal doctrine. 14
Any theory of legal interpretation that either ignores or
deemphasizes the construction of facts is problematic. When ju-
rors are asked to construe "what happened," their analysis is
"infused with implicit assumptions" they make based on their
own cultural knowledge, experiences and perspectives. 15
Judges, too, have almost unfettered flexibility in interpreting
critical thinking skills, while only fifteen percent characterized their goal as teach-
ing students substantive legal doctrine. Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A
Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 1,
20-21 (1996).
14. See Kim L. Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, 30 REPRESEN-
TATIONS 42, 44 (1990) (noting "[tihe debates among the advocates of intentional-
ism, conventionalism, interpretivism, structuralism, literalism, and the rest
proceed as though legal reasoning were merely a matter of understanding a legal
text. Understanding the facts drops out as an uninteresting or unchallenging or
irrelevant part of the process."); Wangerin, supra note 5, at 414 n.4 (noting that
although "it is generally agreed that courses traditionally described as 'substan-
tive' serve, or should serve, as vehicles for skills training, at least if skills training
includes the skill of legal analysis," such has not typically been the reality).
Professor Llewellyn was a strong advocate of the view that first year law
courses have "misemphasized" doctrine. In a notable essay on this subject, he chal-
lenged law professors to rethink how we present our craft to the public, to our
students and to ourselves:
We have fooled ourselves, we have fooled our law professors, we have fooled
the whole bewildered public, into the idea that the essence of our craft lies in
our knowledge of the law. And knowledge of the law we do have, and we do
need, but such knowledge is but the precondition of our work .... Let me
say it again: The essence of our craftsmanship lies in skills, and wisdoms; in
practical, effective, persuasive, inventive skills for getting things done: any
kind of thing in any field; in wisdom and judgment in selecting the things to
get done; in skills for moving men into desired action, any kind of man, in
any field; and then in skills for regularizing the results, for building into
controlled large-scale action such doing of things and such moving of men.
But we do not say this, even to ourselves. Why not? Does it seem too plain,
too ordinary, too much like what needs no license via bar examination? I do
not know. What I know is that because we do not say it to ourselves we do
not study our own essence as we need to, we do not train every lawyer in it,
we do not have and cannot yet phrase or apply standards of minimum com-
petence in it, we do not require entrants to qualify in it, we learn it, each one
of us, only by slow unreckonable accident, happenstance or inborn artistry.
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re-valued, 15 RocKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 2-4
(1942) [hereinafter The Crafts of Law Revalued]; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Law-
yer's Ways and Means, and the Law Curriculum, 30 IOWA L. REV. 333, 335 (1945)
[hereinafter Lawyer's Ways and Means] (describing "misemphasis on 'subject-mat-
ter' as the center of courses taught in class").
15. Scheppele, supra note 14, at 62-63.
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facts, and since there is always opportunity for redescription or
recharacterization of the facts, the judge's interpretation of the
facts can dictate the outcome: 16
It's not easy to see how facts can be recharacterized, once the
opinions have been written.... Opinion writing tends to obscure
alternative versions, to make the version of the facts as presented
seem to meet the Walter Cronkite test: "And that's the way it is."
But behind every description of facts, there are many other ver-
sions, equally true but differently organized. Changes in empha-
sis, alternative points of view, different symbolic contexts, varying
background assumptions all have their effects on which version of
a particular story seems the most compelling.
17
Because of the primary role played by factual analysis and
assumptions, doctrine by itself is insufficient to address even
the simplest legal problems."' Accordingly, law students must
shift their thinking away from memorizing doctrine toward
analysis. So law teachers must tailor the rules to context, in-
cluding historical, political, social, economic, relational, moral,
ethical, commercial and practical context.
There is no shortage of literature about the need to explic-
itly teach fact analysis. Professor Karl Llewellyn devoted much
of his writing to the importance of the study of facts, based on
the notion that "the statement of facts, be it in brief or be it oral,
is the complete guts of your case."19 Professor Robert Marx was
also a noted advocate of teaching facts, explaining that for most
law students, their first experiences as lawyers will be in trial
courts where "the law is usually reasonably clear and well-set-
tled," but the facts are "always in controversy." 20 More recently,
Abraham Ordover, in his 1991 article "Teaching Sensitivity to
Facts," laments the fact that although "most contentions of law
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id. at 49.
18. Caroline N. Brown, Teaching Good Faith, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1377, 1382
(2000).
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
627, 637 (1962) [hereinafter A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy]; see also Karl N.
Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARv. L. REV. 775, 792-
93 (1941); Lawyer's Ways and Means, supra note 14; Karl N. Llewellyn, On What is
Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935); The Crafts
of Law Revalued, supra note 14.
20. Robert S. Marx, Shall Law Schools Establish a Course on "Facts"?, 5 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 524, 524 (1953).
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are won or lost on the facts,"21 such fact work is generally not
taught in law schools. 22 Many others have written about this
pedagogical shortcoming in unified agreement. 23
Various proposals for "facts" courses that include fact anal-
ysis more explicitly in the law school curriculum have been put
forth over the years. Professor Robert Marx pioneered a class
on "Facts" at the University of Cincinnati Law School in the
1950s that dealt with interviewing the client, finding and inter-
viewing witnesses, presenting facts through expert testimony,
discovery and the taking of depositions, marshalling the evi-
dence in preparation for trial, putting forth the facts in trial
briefs, and trial techniques for working with facts through di-
rect and cross examination and opening and closing state-
ments. 24 Professor Ordover has proposed various methods for
teaching fact sensitivity, including a course in "facts," use of ac-
tual clinical cases and simulations where students are required
to interview a client to learn the facts, and an enhanced advo-
cacy curriculum including more skills courses such as pretrial
and advanced litigation and basic trial advocacy. 25 Professor
Jethro Lieberman has also proposed teaching a course on "the
art of the fact." This course would show students "how difficult
it is to uncover facts,"26 force students to "analyze the nature of
21. Ordover, supra note 11, at 815.
22. Id. at 814.
23. For example, Ian Weinstein conceded that "[t]he notion that facts are eas-
ily known, static and need only be plugged into doctrine by judges was debunked
long ago." Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature: Instinct and Automa-
ticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). Despite that truth, he
points out that the study of fact analysis in the law school classroom remains lim-
ited. Id. at 4. Professor Jethro Lieberman similarly argues that "[w]e do not teach
or even talk about the one thing on which lawyers spend most of their time,
namely, ferreting out the facts." Jethro K. Lieberman, The Art of the Fact, 5 LEGAL
WRITING 25, 25-26 (1999); see also Brian Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101:
A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persua-
sive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001) (explaining why "no one teaches
anybody how to write facts sections" but they should); Larry T. Teply & Ralph U.
Whitten, Teaching Civil Procedure Using an Integrated Case-Text-And-Problem
Method, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 91, 95 (2003); HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EH-
LRICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 22 (McGraw-Hill 1972); H. Russell
Cort & Jack L. Sammons, The Search for "Good Lawyering": A Concept and Model
of Lawyering Competencies, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 397, 440-41 (1980).
24. Marx, supra note 20, at 527-28.
25. Ordover, supra note 11, at 818-20.
26. Lieberman, supra note 23, at 33.
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facts," 27 and "persuade students that the facts are not merely
irreducible elements of the universe, but shards of flashes of nu-
ance that it is the lawyer's task to assemble into a story that
will achieve the client's end."28 Professor William Twining's
1984 article, Taking Facts Seriously, describes in some detail
the early attempts to establish courses on fact finding, noting
that although such courses were uniformly considered success-
ful, almost without exception they did not become established
institutional courses.29
Still others have urged for expanded coverage of fact analy-
sis in existing skills-oriented classes. For example, Professor
David Romantz emphasized the "significance of analysis over
doctrine" and the special importance of teaching "how to assess,
analyze and manipulate facts,"30 highlighting the legal writing
course as the necessary arena.31 Based on the work of John H.
Wigmore, in the early twentieth century, many others have
called for a more rigorous teaching of fact analysis in evidence
courses.32
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 34.
29. William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 28 (1984)
(noting that "[t]he serious study of reasoning in regard to disputed matters of fact
is at least as intellectually demanding as the study of reasoning in respect of dis-
puted questions of law").
30. Romantz, supra note 8, at 142-43.
31. Id. at 142 (noting that "[clase method courses cannot teach students to
appreciate the nuance of inference, the subjectivity of truth, or the art of the fact");
see also Foley & Robbins, supra note 23; Jones, supra note 4, at 14 (arguing that a
separate course in legal method would "sav[e] desperately needed law school time,"
allowing schools to "forego the luxury of having all four or five first-semester
courses taught as if they were all principally courses in the fundamentals of case
reading and analysis"); Debra Moss Curtis, You've Got Rhythm: Curriculum Plan-
ning and Teaching Rhythm at Work in the Legal Writing Classroom, 21 ToURo L.
REV. 465 (2005) (highlighting the lack of consciousness that most legal professors
have regarding their pedagogical approach and presenting several legal writing
teaching approaches); Schwartz, supra note 7.
32. Wigmore started a movement, now labeled "evidence, proof and facts" or
"EPF," that calls for greater analysis of the power of facts. John H. Wigmore, The
Problem of Proof, 8 ILL. L. REV. 77 (1913); JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF
JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND
ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (3d ed. 1937). This concept has been espoused
and debated for almost a century. See, e.g., Peter W. Murphy, Teaching Evidence,
Proof and Facts: Providing a Background in Factual Analysis and Case Evalua-
tion, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568 (2001); Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Taking
Fact Analysis Seriously, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1442 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein, The
280
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While the ideas put forth by these scholars are innovative
and reflect thoughtful acknowledgment of the need to empha-
size fact analysis in law teaching, teaching fact analysis exclu-
sively as a separate "skills" course in the curriculum is
problematic on two levels. The first problem is that it perpetu-
ates the distinction between doctrine and skills. It furthers, in
the students' minds, the separation between what goes on in the
doctrinal classes, which is what they perceive as being neces-
sary to graduate from law school and to get a license, and the
actual skills necessary to represent clients, which are taught in
the "lawyering" components of the curriculum.
The second problem is that focusing on teaching fact analy-
sis as a separate course overlooks the enormous untapped po-
tential that exists in doctrinal classes to demonstrate to the
students the seamless connection between doctrine and skills.
That connection, if exploited, potentially presents enormous
power in training lawyers. If faculty do not perceive those doc-
trinal classes as being the natural place to teach fact analysis
explicitly, why use the case method, which is certainly not the
most effective way to teach rules?
To be sure, some professors have proposed teaching fact
analysis in doctrinal courses, but such proposals have tended to
be undeveloped 33 or to look like simulation or clinical models. 34
Teaching of Facts Skills in Courses Presently in the Curriculum, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC.
463, 469 (1954-55).
33. For example, Professor Wangerin credits Professor Strasser with "hinting
at the idea of using the contracts course for skills training in legal analysis," but
points out that "he does not develop these ideas, and his suggestions for change in
the course seem to focus heavily on substance." Wangerin, supra note 5, at 412 n.4
(citing Kurt A. Strasser, Teaching Contracts - Present Criticism and a Modest Pro-
posal for Reform, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 63, 82 (1981-82)). Professor Lieberman also
suggests that in tandem with his proposed course on "the art of the fact," other
courses should be reoriented to highlight the importance of fact analysis, to
achieve "facts across the curriculum." Lieberman, supra note 23, at 37-38. But
unfortunately, this is more of an afterthought, and he too fails to put forth concrete
suggestions.
34. For example, Professor Shreve argues that skills should be taught
throughout the curriculum. Gene R. Shreve, Bringing the Educational Reforms of
the Cramton Report into the Case Method Classroom - Two Models, 59 WASH. U.
L.Q. 793 (1981). But as Professor Wangerin points out, "after making that obser-
vation ...he describes two models that are, in effect, indistinguishable from
clinical/simulation models." Wangerin, supra note 5, at 412 n.4. Similarly, in Pro-
fessor Keith Findley's thought-provoking article about curricular reform at the
University of Wisconsin he advocates for the integration of lawyering skills into
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:271
Other professors have written extensively about teaching skills
across the curriculum, but the focus of those suggestions has
tended to be on lawyering skills such as drafting or negotiating,
with little emphasis on academic skills like fact analysis. 35
There are several noted exceptions. For example, Professor
Jonathan Hyman put forth specific suggestions for incorporat-
ing practical skills, including fact analysis, into the contracts
class using the NITA method, 36 and Professor Kenney Hegland
has written about incorporating role-play exercises into the con-
tracts class to illustrate, in part, "how much the 'facts' are a
product of client/attorney interaction."37 But such proposals are
few and far between.
the substantive curriculum throughout all three years of law school, but mostly
through simulations or enhanced legal writing, skills and clinical opportunities.
Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Reform in Wiscon-
sin, 24 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 295, 327-28 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hyman, Discovery and Invention: The NITA Method
in the Contracts Classroom, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 779 (1991) (explaining
how and why he incorporates seven skills exercises into his contracts class, while
skipping large sections of the casebook); Edith Warkentine, Why Teach Contracts
Transactionally?, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 723 (2003) (discussing the benefits of using
actual contracts to teach the contracts course); Carol Chomsky & Maury Lands-
man, Introducing Negotiation and Drafting into the Contracts Classroom, 44 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1545 (2000) (discussing the use of drafting or negotiating exercises in
the contracts classroom); Scott J. Burnham, Using Contracts to Teach Practical
Skills: Drafting in the Contracts Class, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1535 (2000); Judith A.
Frank, Lessons and Ideas: Skills Instruction in Large Law School Classes, 3 T.M.
COOLEY J. PPAc. & CLINICAL L. 307 (2000) (discussing incorporating lawyering
skills into a wills class); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Desegregating the Law School Cur-
riculum: How to Integrate More of the Skills and Values Identified by the MacCrate
Report into a Doctrinal Course, 3 NEv. L.J. 32 (2002) (discussing incorporating
lawyering skills into a property or trusts and estates class).
36. Hyman, supra note 35, at 767-68. Professor Hyman proposes an exercise
for the Contracts class using Vines v. Orchard Hills. Inc., 435 A.2d 1022 (Conn.
1980), a case about awarding restitution damages to the breaching party. He sug-
gests a short exercise requiring students to "list the facts they would like to collect
and the witnesses they would like to hear from in preparing for a new trial," and
then discusses their collective list as a class. Hyman, supra note 35, at 767-68.
Since one of the elements of a claim for restitution is lack of willfulness, the exer-
cise requires students to focus on the facts that would support or counter that ele-
ment, and the inferences lawyers must make from those facts. Id.
37. Kenney Hegland, Fun and Games in the First Year: Contracts by Roleplay,
31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 534, 541-42 (1981-82) (noting that "facts are seldom given and
that they are always, in the retelling, the partial product of point of view"); see also
Wangerin supra note 5, at 433 (describing the best class exercises as ones in which
students are encouraged to recast facts as sympathetic for each side); Tepley &
Whitten, supra note 23 (presenting case text and problem method as the best vehi-
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With increasing pressure to expand coverage of rules and
principles of law tested on the bar, there is certainly some un-
derstandable resistance to adding skills work into the doctrinal
curriculum. Despite an increased recognition of the importance
of analytical skills to the work of a lawyer, in the tradeoff be-
tween doctrine and skills, doctrine still tends to win. Some be-
lieve that the types of skills at issue cannot really be taught, but
rather can be intuited from common sense, while others have
suggested these skills are already familiar to law students, hav-
ing been learned elsewhere in the curriculum or outside of law
school. 38 But any loss in coverage from an emphasis on skills
such as fact analysis is certainly counterbalanced with the
deeper and more profound understanding of the doctrine that
comes with learning it in context. And let's face it, doctrine too
can be learned elsewhere, through lecture and reading.39
II. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon and the Highly Fact-Dependant
Doctrines of Good Faith and Best Efforts
A. The Case
In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,40 the defendant, Lady
cle to cover the complicated analysis and skills needed in Civil Procedure classes);
Schwartz, supra note 7 (critiquing the "vicarious learning" model and its deficien-
cies in creating an environment in which all students can learn).
38. See Foley & Robbins, supra note 23, at 462-63 (lamenting the fact that
this is a common belief among law professors). For example, Professor Weinstein,
back in 1954, argued that there is no need for a separate course on facts, because
"the kind of students that come to law school are, in the main, bright, imaginative,
worldly, and eager to make their way materially." Weinstein, supra note 32, at
463-64. These students, he argued, are able to gather what they need to know
about fact analysis from the case method, and from "powerful and healthy non-
academic educational facilities being available to almost all young attorneys." Id.
at 464. To the extent he believes fact analysis should be taught, he suggests that it
is already successfully taught through the regular curriculum, noting that "[tihe
case method is uniquely conceived and designed to build a foundation for an under-
standing of the relationship of facts to law and for skillful handling of facts," id. at
465, and that teaching the use of facts on trial is already properly taught in proce-
dure and evidence courses. Id. at 469. For a thorough response to these ideas, see
Twining, supra note 29, at 33-35.
39. This view was held by Karl Llewellyn, who suggested that law professors
"[clonsider the elimination from the center of a case-course of the present emphasis
on 'covering subject matter' in class, with that problem relegated to the outside
reading of the student." See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 215.
40. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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Duff-Gordon, was a top fashion designer 4' ("Lucile" was her cou-
ture label 42). She hired the plaintiff, Otis F. Wood, a top New
York advertising agent who represented many celebrities, 43 to
manage her product-design and endorsement business. 44 Under
the terms of the contract, Wood was to have the exclusive right,
subject to Lady Duff-Gordon's approval, to place her endorse-
ments on the designs of others and to sell her own designs or to
license others to market them.45 In return, Lady Duff-Gordon
was to receive half of all the profits and revenues derived from
Wood's contracts.46 "The exclusive right was to last at least one
year from April 1, 1915, and, thereafter, from year to year un-
less terminated by notice of 90 days."47
Wood brought a breach of contract claim against Lady Duff-
Gordon, asserting that he had kept his part of the contract but
that the defendant had endorsed other products (a mass cloth-
ing line for Sears, Roebuck and an interior design for the Chal-
mers motorcar48 ) without his knowledge and kept the profits.49
Lady Duff-Gordon argued that their contract lacked considera-
tion, as Mr. Wood was not bound by anything. 50 She argued
that she was required to give her name, making Wood's rights
to market her designs exclusive, but he did not actually make
any promise in return.51 While he had exclusive right to place
her endorsement on the designs of others and was required to
41. Id. (explaining "[tihe things which she designs, fabrics, parasols and what
not, have a new value in the public mind when issued in her name").
42. To view designs from the Lucile collection, see Gown by Lucile Sells for
$38,850 at Doyle New York's November 16, 2004 Auction of Vintage Couture, Tex-
tiles and Accessories, DOYLE NEWS, Nov. 16, 2004, available at http://
www.doylenewyork.com/pr/couture/04CT02/default.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008)
(Explaining "Lucile, Lady Duff Gordon... was the first internationally celebrated
British woman couturier, due not only to her innovative haute bohemian design
and dressmaking skills but also her flair for marketing and publicity.").
43. For more background information on Otis F. Wood, see VICTOR GOLDBERG,
FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 43 (Harvard Univ. Press
2006), more specifically Chapter 2 entitled Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon with the Help from the Kewpie Dolls.
44. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
45. Id; Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 164 N.Y.S. 576, 577 (App. Div. 1917).
46. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214; Wood, 164 N.Y.S. at 577.
47. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
48. See GOLDBERG, supra note 43.
49. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214; Wood, 164 N.Y.S. at 577.
50. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
51. Id. at 214-15; Wood, 164 N.Y.S. at 577.
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pay her half the profits, he never actually promised to place her
endorsement on any designs and had no actual duty to market
her designs. 52 He could choose to make no endorsements, she
claimed, and still not be in breach.53
The New York Appellate Division found that the contract
was void for lack of consideration.5 4 Although the plaintiff
promised to collect revenues derived from endorsements, sales
and licenses, the promise was not binding unless he actually
placed endorsements, made sales or granted licenses, which the
contract did not require him to do.55 The court noted:
The enforcement of his promise to collect and pay over is thus
made to depend upon an act which he has not agreed to perform,
and which the defendant cannot compel him to perform. He
promises to collect revenues from the indorsements, provided he
sees fit to place the indorsements. 56
The court thus concluded that the contract should be car-
ried out as written, even if the effect were to release Lady Duff-
Gordon from a contract both parties had most likely intended to
be binding.57
The New York Court of Appeals, in a landmark opinion
written by Judge Cardozo, reversed, holding that the contract
contained an implied promise on the part of Mr. Wood "to use
reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into exis-
tence."58 The court reasoned that in this exclusive dealing
agreement, where she gave him an exclusive privilege, and her
remuneration depended entirely on his efforts, the court would
not "suppose that one party was to be placed at the mercy of the
other."5 9 Despite the lack of explicit consideration in the con-
tract itself, the court presumed that the parties actually in-
tended for there to be a binding contract. 60 The duty to use best
52. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214-15; Wood, 164 N.Y.S. at 577.
53. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214-15; Wood, 164 N.Y.S. at 577.
54. Wood, 164 N.Y.S. at 578.
55. Id. at 577.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 215.
'9. Id. at 214
60. Id. The court stated:
The defendant insists ... that [the agreement] lacks the elements of a con-
tract. She says the plaintiff does not bind himself to anything. It is true
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efforts reflects social norms and shared values of reciprocity,
and since people normally intend to comply with social norms,
the court must have reasoned, a duty to use best efforts must
have been within the normal expectations of the parties under
these circumstances. 61
The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals opinions re-
flect an ongoing debate about the reliability of language, the in-
herent meaning of words, and how far language can be
stretched. 62 The Lady Duff-Gordon case epitomizes the turn of
the century trend toward a contextualist approach to contact in-
terpretation, allowing reduced specificity and greater uncer-
tainty in contracting and a greater role for courts in enforcing
contracts. 63 An agreement that certainly would not have been
enforceable years before was enforced in Wood, and would rou-
tinely be enforced in years to come.
B. The Doctrines of Good Faith and Best Efforts
The fact-sensitive doctrines of good faith and best efforts
are especially good for teaching fact identification and fact anal-
ysis. The notion of good faith is largely resistant to any univer-
sal definition.64 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
provides that "[elvery contract imposes upon each party a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
that he does not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable ef-
forts to place the defendant's indorsements and market her design. We
think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied.
Id.
61. Id. (noting "[tihe law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when
the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal").
62. At the heart of the debate is the conflict between individual choice and
social control-whether implying an obligation of good faith and best efforts into
every contract is a socially imposed standard of behavior (i.e. externally imposed
requirements), or an accurate reflection of the parties' actual intentions (i.e. self-
imposed controls), and whether self-imposed controls are more legitimate than so-
cially-imposed. On the one hand, contracts should be freely created by individuals,
not imposed on individuals by society, and it is unfair to hold parties to something
they did not agree to. But at the same time, people should be held to certain social
norms so that contracting parties can rely on their legitimate expectations. Addi-
tionally, concepts like good faith may equalize bargains where there is no or very
little bargaining power, recognizing social interests greater than freedom of con-
tract in some cases.
63. Walter F. Pratt, American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39
S.C. L. REV. 415 (1988).
64. Brown, supra note 18, at 1380.
286 [Vol. 28:271
INTEGRATING ACADEMIC SKILLS
ment."65 According to the Restatement, good faith includes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party. 66 The definition ex-
cludes conduct characterized as bad faith, including overt action
or inaction, evasion of spirit of bargain, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse
of power to specify terms, and interference with the other
party's performance. 67 The Uniform Commercial Code defines
good faith as "honesty in fact and observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing."68 The related duty of best
efforts typically arises in the specific factual circumstance when
one party has discretion and requires a party to make reasona-
ble efforts in light of that party's ability and the means at its
disposal and of the other party's justifiable expectations. 69
The common thread running through these definitions is
that each involves standards of "reasonableness" and "fairness,"
requiring application of the rule to be flexible, and its meaning
and effect to vary tremendously, depending on the context.
Since divergent inferences about good faith can almost always
be drawn from any set of facts, the good faith doctrine is espe-
cially useful for showing the critical relationship between facts
and rules, and the role that facts play in legal analysis.
III. Using Lady Duff-Gordon to Teach the Role of Facts in
Legal Reasoning
If the doctrine of good faith and best efforts is an ideal vehi-
cle for teaching the importance of fact identification and fact
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
66. Id. § 205 cmt. a.
67. Id.
68. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (amended 2003). The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) states, "regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application
and the observance of good faith in international trade," leaving it to the courts to
define the term "good faith." United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, Art. 7(1), April 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, An-
nex 1. The CISG refers to the doctrine of "good faith" only once. John Klein, Good
Faith in International Transactions, 15 LrvERPOOL L. REV. 115, 120 (1993). See
generally Franco Ferrari, Gap-Filling and Interpretation of the CISG: Overview of
International Case Law, 7 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARn. 63 (2003).
69. J.C. Bruno, "Best Efforts" Defined, 71 MICH. B.J. 74 (1992), for a discus-
sion on the difference between good faith and best efforts.
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analysis, then Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon is the ideal
case. Written by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the facts set the
stage for the landmark conclusion that an obligation of best ef-
forts was implied in the contract.
A. Use of Facts, Grammar and Word Choice in Legal Writing
In-Class Exercise Part I: Ask the class to consider the facts
as presented by the court. What facts did the court highlight?
Which, if any, did the court downplay? How did the court use
grammar and word choice, if at all, to strengthen its position?
In legal writing, the importance of storytelling techniques
such as specific word choice and grammatical structure, organi-
zation, point of view, voice, style and description, cannot be
overstated. In describing fiction writing techniques that can be
adapted to legal writing, Professors Brian Foley and Ruth Anne
Robbins assert that word choice is paramount:
What we call something goes a long way toward what or how a
reader will think of that thing. For example, do we call the dog
that bit the plaintiff a "pet," a "guard dog," a "Doberman," or, sim-
ply by its name "Chocolate?"70
Similarly, they explain, "how the writer defines the conflict
goes a long way toward how a reader will want the conflict re-
solved."71 For example, commonly in fiction writing, themes are
presented in terms such as "Man Against Man," "Man Against
Self' or "Man Against Machine." 72 If lawyers can characterize
the facts to frame the issue in a way that pits the client in a
struggle against a less sympathetic entity, it will give the
reader an interest in seeing that client prevail. So "if the reader
pitches a conflict as Man Against Society, or Man Against Ma-
chine, in the sense of the 'little guy' v. 'big guy,' many readers
instinctively root for the 'little guy.' If the conflict is Man
Against Self, most readers want the person's better nature to
prevail." 73 The order in which the writer presents the informa-
tion is also critical.7 4 For example, the lawyer should include
background information as a way to orient the reader with re-
70. Foley & Robbins, supra note 23, at 466.
71. Id. at 470.
72. Id. at 469.
73. Id. at 470.
74. Id. at 475.
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spect to the nature of the conflict, making it clear for whom the
reader should root.75
Finally, grammatical structure can play a critical role in
the persuasiveness of ideas. 76 Grammar is both a mechanical
set of rules concerning tense, syntax and the like, and a shared
set of linguisitical ploys that operate as persuasive shorthand. 77
For example, short, bold, conclusory sentences can reflect a
heightened level of certainty, while longer, more sinuous
sentences generally create the impression of complexity. 78 Sim-
ilarly, active voice typically denotes strength and confidence,
while passive voice connotes a more ambivalent position, partic-
ularly in situations where the legal determination will likely be
a "close call."79 The passive voice obscures the actor behind the
information presented, either because the actor is unknown or
the fact presented is unfavorable and the writer wishes to de-
flect the reader's attention.80
It has been widely observed that in the Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon case "readers... know who will ultimately win by the
time they read the third word in the case."8 ' And if they do not
know by then, they will certainly figure it out by the time Judge
Cardozo finishes setting forth the background facts. In a lec-
ture delivered by Professor Karl Llewellyn in 1962, he discussed
how Judge Cardozo uses, or even manipulates, the facts to paint
a sympathetic plaintiff. The case begins:
The defendant styles herself a creator of fashions. Her favor
helps a sale. Manufacturers of dresses, millinery, and like arti-
cles are glad to pay for a certificate of her approval. The things
75. Id.
76. See Lillian B. Hardwick, Classical Persuasion Through Grammar and
Punctuation, 3 J. ASs'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75 (2006) (discussing the role
grammar plays in clearly expressing ideas, and how poor grammar can be both a
distraction and an obstacle to comprehension).
77. Bruce A. Markall, Truth?, 72 IND. L.J. 1115, 1118 (1997) (discussing how
various forms of legal argument create a "grammar of legal justification" that can
be used to support a legal claim); see also Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 693 (2005) (discussing the "grammar ofjustification" as
the central device in the practice of law).
78. Hardwick, supra note 76, at 77.
79. Wangerin, supra note 5, at 438.
80. Kathleen Dillon Narko, Sentences: Short and Sweet, CBA REc. (Chicago
Bar Association), Nov. 19, 2005, at 58.
81. Wangerin, supra note 5, at 437.
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which she designs, fabrics, parasols, and what not, have a new
value in the public mind when issued in her name. She employed
the plaintiff to help her turn this vogue into money.8 2
"The defendant 'styles herself a creator of fashions."8 3 This
is not a neutral statement about her job, but a deeper implicit
statement about her character. Llewellyn points out that Judge
Cardozo "subtly" paints a picture of a "nasty person,"8 4 gradu-
ally building up sympathy for Wood and setting up Lady Duff-
Gordon's certain failure in this action. Cardozo continues:
He was to have the exclusive right, subject always to her ap-
proval, to place her indorsements on the designs of others. He
was also to have the exclusive right to place her own designs on
sale, or to license others to market them. In return, she was to
have one-half of all profits and revenues derived from any con-
tracts he might make. The exclusive right was to last at least one
year from April 1, 1915, and thereafter from year to year unless
terminated by notice of 90 days.85
The way these facts are presented, they can lead to but one
conclusion-that the parties intended to enter into a binding
agreement.8 6 Without explicitly stating so, Cardozo describes a
detailed business transaction, using legal and contracting lan-
guage such as "exclusive right," "subject to her approval," "li-
cense others" and "terminated by notice of 90 days."8 7 And
then, as if it were not already clear, Cardozo describes the hall-
mark of any serious commercial contract: "The agreement of
employment is signed by both parties. It has a wealth of recit-
als."8 8 Despite the fact that the agreement resembles a contract
in every way, and against all reason, the defendant "insists ...
that it lacks the elements of a contract."8 9 Is there any doubt
that the court will find a binding contract?
82. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
83. Id.
84. A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, supra note 19, at 637.
85. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
86. A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, supra note 19, at 637 (commenting
"what wonderful legal language, to make it legally enforceable" and "[m]y heavens,
isn't this legal?").
87. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moving on to the legal analysis, Judge Cardozo appears to
rely exclusively on the fact that the agreement very strongly re-
sembles a contract, with a "wealth of recitals" and the signa-
tures of both parties, in implying the existence of
consideration.9 0 He notes that although the plaintiff does not
promise "in so many words" to do anything in exchange for get-
ting the exclusive right to make indorsements, such a promise
"is fairly to be implied."91 Cardozo draws this conclusion based
on his now famous statement that "a promise may be lacking,
and yet the whole writing may be instinct with obligation, im-
perfectly expressed."92 To justify this conclusion, he again
points to the details of the writing, specifically the fact that
Lady Duff-Gordon "gave an exclusive privilege," with "no right
for at least a year to place her own indorsements or market her
own designs except through the agency of the plaintiff,"93 and
the fact that her "sole compensation for the grant of an exclu-
sive agency is to be one-half of all the profits resulting from the
plaintiffs efforts."94 These provisions, Cardozo explains, only
make sense in a context that requires the plaintiff to make such
efforts-otherwise she gets nothing. So, ultimately, Cardozo
convinces readers that the extensive and detailed terms of the
contract suggest that the parties intended to conclude a deal,
and the deal only makes sense if Lady Lucy is to get something
in return for her grant of exclusive agency to Wood.
In addition to characterizing the power dynamic between
the plaintiff and defendant through word usage, Cardozo also
uses grammatical devices to demonstrate the relationship es-
tablished between the parties. In particular, Cardozo uses
short, conclusory sentences, such as "[hier favor helps a sale,"
and "[it has a wealth of recitals," that underscore the pro-
plaintiff tone of the opinion. 95 He also speaks in the authorita-







96. Cardozo refers to the court in the collective "we" on multiple occasions.
After paraphrasing the defendant's argument that no express promise was made,
he states, "[wie think, however, that such a promise is to be fairly implied." Id.
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framing of facts is solid, and that the conclusions drawn by the
court are the only rational outcomes.
B. Making the Losing Party's Case
In-Class Exercise Part II: Ask the class to rewrite the court's
statement of facts to generate sympathy for the losing party,
Lady Duff-Gordon, and to justify a holding in her favor. Have
them use only what they can gather about the parties and the
context from the opinion itself, including the sophistication of
the parties, the nature and detail of the agreement and any so-
cial norms that might have come into play. Have them empha-
size helpful facts, and explain or deemphasize harmful facts.
Have them pay particular attention to their grammar and word
choice, in painting a subtle but emotional or expressive picture of
the time and place.
Then show the class Karl Llewellyn's masterful retelling of
the story, using the identical facts:
The plaintiff in this action rests his case upon his own carefully
prepared form agreement, which has as its first essence his own
omission of any expression whatsoever of any obligation of any
kind on the part of this same plaintiff. We thus have the familiar
situation of a venture in which one party, here the defendant, has
an asset, with what is, in advance, of purely speculative value.
The other party, the present plaintiff, who drew the agreement, is a
marketer eager for profit, but chary of risk. The legal question
presented is whether the plaintiff, while carefully avoiding all risk
in the event of failure, can nevertheless claim full profit in the
event that the market may prove favorable in its response. The law
of consideration joins with the principles of business decency in
giving the answer. And the answer is no.97
Behind every set of facts is another version of the same
story-another perspective of the same set of facts. Llewellyn
suggests that if an appeal has any merit, any "competent tech-
nician" can craft the "letter perfect case," and the question be-
comes "which view, among the possibilities, is the court going to
accept?"98
Later, as Cardozo lays out the factual support for his conclusion he writes, "[wie
are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the mercy of the other." Id.
97. A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, supra note 19, at 638.
98. Id. at 629.
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Llewellyn's restatement of the facts of course places pre-
mier emphasis on the fact that the parties did not include a best
efforts clause in the contract itself. He implicitly uses the same
facts as Cardozo-the extensive and detailed terms of the con-
tract-to suggest that if the parties had intended to include a
best efforts clause, they would have done so. They were sophis-
ticated parties who took care in preparing the form. Indeed, the
plaintiff prepared the agreement himself, most likely with the
input of an attorney. This was no case of sloppy drafting, but
rather, intentional omission of a key term on the part of the
contract drafter, so as to take advantage of a chance at great
profit with little accompanying risk.
C. Omitted Facts
In-Class Exercise Part III: Ask the class to consider what
additional facts, if true, might have changed the outcome of the
case.
Many professors have criticized the case method for failing
to teach students to identify and work with relevant facts be-
cause of the limited facts reported in the typical case and
casebook. Professor Weinstein, for example, has noted that
"[w]e may analyze how a judge stresses or ignores a fact to sup-
port an outcome, but appellate case analysis is not a vehicle for
studying how facts are included or excluded from the record
altogether."99
But this shortcoming of the case method can be turned to
the teacher's advantage. Professor Wangerin would seize on
this limitation of the case method as an opportunity to teach
about the use of facts:
Inventive use of the reported facts in casebooks and speculation
about facts not reported give students an excellent introduction to
the role of facts in legal disputes. In fact, a commonly criticized
99. Weinstein, supra note 32.; see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 352 (assert-
ing that "requiring and encouraging the use of cases already studied and discussed
in class does not test whether students have developed the skills of reading and
analyzing new court opinions"); Edith R. Warkentine, Kingsfield Doesn't Teach My
Contracts Class: Using Contracts to Teach Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112 (2000)
(advocating the document-based approach over the case method because it "com-
bines the very best of the problem method and the simulation method" and empha-




aspect of many casebooks, that the statements of facts are too con-
densed, can be a great tool for learning. The absence of specific
facts creates a broad opportunity to speculate about the real facts
in a dispute.' 00
Similarly, Llewellyn suggests approaching a given case
"from the front," as a problem for solution, rather than "from
the rear," as a problem already solved. 1 1 According to Llewel-
lyn, rather than blindly relying on the recitation of facts in any
given case, case discussions should emphasis the materials
available to work with, before the decision and in the decision,
with intensified discussions of background facts and policy, and
a "vastly more sustained discussion of details more fully
presented and more clearly seen . ,lO"102
The facts included in the Lady Duff-Gordon case, together
with one key omitted fact, can be used to illustrate the risk of
relying too heavily on the facts as reported in the opinion. In an
article comparing the Lady Duff-Gordon case to a case brought
by the same plaintiff against Rose O'Neill, the developer of the
Kewpie doll, Professor Victor Goldberg points out that the
Kewpie contract, signed shortly before the Lady Duff-Gordon
contract, explicitly included a best efforts clause. The inclusion
of such a clause in a prior contract suggested that the lack of
specificity in the Lady Duff-Gordon contract might not have
been sloppy drafting, but rather an intentional omission. 10 3
This bit of context highlights the extent to which Judge Cardozo
ably used the facts to justify the implication of a clause that
could easily have been written into the contract.
100. Wangerin, supra note 5, at 439 n.20; see also Dean Terrance Sandalow,
The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 172 (1984) (not-
ing that "a skillful teacher will lead students to read opinions imaginatively, with
attention to the human possibilities that lie beneath their abstract language").
101. Llewellyn, supra note, 1, at 213. Llewellyn argues that the more com-
mon, but less vital approach, looks at a case
as a something done and complete, a something which provides an authori-
tative datum about the state of the law, a something to be tested, therefore,
for how far it reaches, how solidly it may be expected to stand up under later
events, and-on a sharply different level-for how wise it is or how it fits
together with other decisions or principles of law.
Id.
102. Id. at 214.
103. Victor Goldberg, Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon with Help
from the Kewpie Dolls, in FRAMIrN CONTRACT LAw 43 (2007).
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INTEGRATING ACADEMIC SKILLS
These exercises can be done with any case, but the Lady
Duff-Gordon case is especially effective because of Judge Car-
dozo's brilliant use of the facts to craft the story he wanted to
tell. The exercises are meant to show how the facts can be used
to set the stage for the overall legal theory developed later in
the argument. They can be used to help students identify and
distinguish between legally significant and immaterial facts,
and to become aware of, or maybe more alert to, how the facts
can be used and shaped in litigation. The exercises force stu-
dents to consider the world and culture in which the transaction
takes place, and the effect that may have on the parties' under-
standings. They highlight the danger in assigning the facts a
singular, monolithic meaning, forcing students to consider the
importance of the way the facts are characterized, from the
choice to highlight or omit a fact, to the style or tone, down to
the specific word choice.
Ideally these exercises can be done with minimal intrusion
into course coverage. Students can be asked to prepare answers
to the questions in advance of class in preparation for the dis-
cussion of the case, the exercises can be used as in-class or take-
home writing assignments or posted on TWEN site discussion
forums, or these issues can be examined through the use of
break-out groups during class time, as time permits.
IV. Conclusion
There is... a serious dissonance between our higher aspirations
as teachers and our examination and grading practices. We aspire
to teach mental habits that transcend substantive law but we do
not try very hard to find out how well we are succeeding. 104
In our work with beginning law students, we urge them to
try to resist, at least a little, the overwhelming seductive power
of doctrine, and to remember that one of their major tasks in
their first year is to learn how the law works, and not only what
the law is. It is an uphill battle, confounded by convention in
both legal education and the materials law professors tend to
use. But it is becoming increasingly clear that we can integrate
the teaching of reasoning skills into substantive courses more
104. David P. Bryden, What do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 479, 480 (1984).
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effectively, and that doing so will enrich both the teaching and
the learning of law.
Applying the law to the facts of a given case lies at the
heart of legal analysis. But the depth to which doctrinal teach-
ers often restrict themselves in their conception of fact analysis
is to allocate facts to elements and sides (i.e. this fact supports
this element, this fact supports that element), thereby treating
facts as concrete, immutable truths as opposed to the product of
manipulation, or an otherwise conscious choice about language.
The very existence of a fact is not rooted in reality. Whether it
was raining depends on whether the side that wants it to be
raining gets the evidence admitted. Then, there is the matter of
interpretation. Might the answer depend on how the question
is framed ("Was it raining?" versus "Was it raining or pouring?")
or whether a drizzle amounts to rain? How the lawyer charac-
terizes the facts can be the most important determinant of the
outcome of the case.
A given fact can often be used in different ways to support
opposing positions-accordingly, different conclusions can be
drawn depending on the significance assigned to that fact. Stu-
dents who are able to recognize the importance and complexity
of arranging the events in a particular order, paying close atten-
tion to language, word choice, and grammatical structure, and
constructing the facts to weave a sympathetic tale, will be
forced to examine more closely the nuances of the rule, will be-
come more nimble in applying the rule to the facts, and ulti-
mately will be better prepared to take essay exams and will be
better lawyers.
[Vol. 28:271296
